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Abstract
Introduction
Reliance on out-of-pocket payment for healthcare may lead poor households to undertake
catastrophic health expenditure, and risk-pooling mechanisms have been recommended to
mitigate such burdens for households in Bangladesh. About 88% of the population of Ban-
gladesh depends on work in the informal sector. We aimed to estimate willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for CBHI and identify its determinants among three categories of urban informal
workers rickshaw-pullers, shopkeepers and restaurant workers.
Methods
The bidding game version of contingent valuation method was used to estimate weekly
WTP. In three urban locations 557 workers were interviewed using a structured question-
naire during 2010 and 2011. Multiple-regression analysis was used to predict WTP by
demographic and household characteristics, occupation, education level and past illness.
Results
WTP for a CBHI scheme was expressed by 86.7% of informal workers. Weekly average
WTP was 22.8 BDT [Bangladeshi Taka; 95% confidence interval (CI) 20.9–24.8] or 0.32
USD and varied significantly across occupational groups (p = 0.000) and locations (p =
0.003). WTP was highest among rickshaw-pullers (28.2 BDT or 0.40 USD; 95% CI: 24.7–
31.7), followed by restaurant workers (20.4 BDT 0.29 USD; 95% CI: 17.0–23.8) and shop-
keepers (19.2 BDT or 0.27 USD; 95% CI: 16.1–22.4). Multiple regression analysis identified
monthly income, occupation, geographical location and educational level as the key deter-
minants of WTP. WTP increased 0.196% with each 1% increase in monthly income, and
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was 26.9% lower among workers with up to a primary level of education versus those with
higher than primary, but less than one year of education.
Conclusion
Informal workers in urban areas thus are willing to pay for CBHI and socioeconomic differ-
ences explain the magnitude of WTP. The policy maker might think introducing community-
based model including public-community partnership model for healthcare financing of
informal workers. Decision making regarding the implementation of such schemes should
consider worker location and occupation.
Introduction
Reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for healthcare increases the financial burden of
households and causes impoverishment [1–4]. OOP spending is the major payment strategy
for healthcare in most low and middle income countries, including Bangladesh. In Bangladesh
OOP payments comprise 63.3% of total healthcare expenditure [5,6]. In a study of 11 Asian
countries including Bangladesh, the investigators reported that OOP payments for healthcare
impoverish 5 million people annually in Bangladesh [7]. Another study found the people of
Bangladesh to exhibit the highest incidence of catastrophic health expenditure (15.57%)
among 14 Asian countries [8].
Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in expanding coverage for essential public health
interventions, such as immunization, which has markedly reduced maternal and child mortal-
ity rates [9]. However, coverage for secondary and tertiary care health services remains very
limited, especially to the poor and vulnerable segments of society [10]. The government of Ban-
gladesh spent only 629.8 BDT [(Bangladeshi Taka) (6.2 USD)] per capita on healthcare during
2012,while per capita OOP expenditure on health totaled 1,723.0 BDT (17.1 USD)[5]. In Ban-
gladesh, private health expenditure constitutes 68.6% of total healthcare expenditure, of which
92.3% is covered through OOP payments[5]. In this context, despite significant improvement
in numerous health indicators, availability of resources for health remains inadequate and
financial protection for health expenditures is limited. On average around 15.6% of households
faced catastrophic health expenditure because of the high burden of OOP payments [8].The
WHO has determined that OOP payments are the least effective way to pay for healthcare
[11].
While tax revenue and micro health insurance are two possible mechanisms for financing
healthcare for low income citizens in Bangladesh, the former is currently insufficient because
the government allocates only a small portion of its budget to healthcare (just 4.2% of govern-
ment budget in 2012–13) and even that minimal commitment is subject to political interfer-
ence [12].The tax-base in Bangladesh is small and the inclusion of low-income people
(especially informal workers) in the tax system remains challenging and may not sufficient for
this large group of population. The self-financed health schemes can be new source of financ-
ing beside tax revenue.
The International Labour Office(ILO) defines informal workers as own-account workers
(excluding administrative workers and professionals), unpaid family workers, and employers
and employees working in establishments with less than 10 staff [13]. Considering the impor-
tance of informal workers to the economy of Bangladesh, where they comprise 88% of the
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labor force and contribute 64% of GDP [14], efforts to attract these people to self-financing for
healthcare are important.
Risk-pooling mechanisms are recommended to mitigate the consequences of dependence
on OOP healthcare payments and to finance healthcare and help achieve universal coverage.
The common/known consequences are suffering severe financial difficulties and falling into
poverty[1–4]. Moreover, due to the large unpredictable OOP payment for healthcare the
household often force to choose harder coping mechanisms like, borrowing with interest, asset
selling [15]. The inclusion of informal workers in mutual insurance includes such challenges as
making contributions or premiums more affordable for the poorest; increasing the range of ser-
vices offered and the proportion of total costs covered; and improving financial management
[16].
Occupational associations can provide a platform via which to engage with such workers
regarding healthcare financing[10,17]. The Healthcare Financing Strategy of Bangladesh pro-
posed extending health coverage to the entire population together with mechanisms for financ-
ing this, and showed that 85.7 million people (56.2% of the population) or 19.0 million
households are connected to the informal sector and could be targeted by tax-funded health-
care, community-based health insurance (CBHI), micro health insurance, social protection
schemes and other innovative initiatives for healthcare financing[10]. Community based health
financing or CBHI is predominantly used for collective action in raising, pooling, allocating,
purchasing, and supervising health financing arrangements, and is designed to spread costs
and risks among members [18]. Long term experience with such schemes remains limited.
In the absence of data on actual health insurance usage, economists gauge willingness-to-
pay (WTP) for health insurance in low-income countries via contingent valuation methods
(CVM) which directly elicit what individuals would be willing to pay for a hypothetical health
insurance package[19]. However, few studies have sought to understand WTP for health insur-
ance in Bangladesh. This study aims to estimate WTP for CBHI and identify its determinants
among selected groups of urban informal workers.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Informed written consent was taken from all interviewees, and confidentiality and anonymity
were ensured. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the International
Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b).
Setting and sample
Three informal occupational groups (rickshaw-puller, shopkeepers and restaurant workers)
were selected as study participants in three locations in Dhaka (a metropolitan city), Chandpur
(a district town) and Nobinagar/Savar (a sub-district). These occupational groups were selected
for investigation based on their prevalence throughout all urban areas in Bangladesh. The loca-
tions were selected to represent three levels in the urban administrative hierarchy of Bangla-
desh and thus achieve a national urban representation.
A sampling frame comprising all informal workers in the selected study locations did not
exist because informal workers are not officially registered. However, a number of formal or
informal worker cooperatives exist in all areas. To identify the study participants, we identified
worker cooperatives and market places using transect walks and informal group discussions
with community members and leaders. A list of workers was collected from the representa-
tives/leaders of cooperatives or market places. A number of inclusion and exclusion criteria
were applied. The inclusion criteria were age (18 years or above) and experience (working in
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the same occupation for at least the past year). The exclusion criteria were workers having
health insurance or health insurance education [20]. Finally, we randomly selected 594 partici-
pants from the list of potential subjects. Data were collected by trained interviewers during 15
December, 2010 to 15 April, 2011 in all study areas. Among the 594 selected participants, 557
responded to the survey.
Data collection tool
The informal worker was interviewed through a structured questionnaire. The worker was
asked for demographic characteristics, household characteristics, monthly income and expen-
diture, health seeking behavior and bidding questions on WTP for health insurance. The
monthly income information was asked separately to the worker for himself and the other
member of his household. The household income from other sources (like, renting agriculture
land, savings and fixed asset) was also collected. However, household expenditure data was not
collected separately for specific items (like, food, clothing, and utility) rather the workers were
asked for monthly average expenditure.
Willingness to pay measurement
CVM was used to measure WTP for health insurance. This method has previously been used
in many studies[21–23]. CVM questions can be either open-ended or discrete[24]. In an open-
ended valuation the respondents are asked to state their maximumWTP for the benefit, typi-
cally using the so called “bidding game”. A bidding game resembles an auction, where a first
bid is made to a respondent who then either accepts or rejects. Depending on the answer, the
bid is then adjusted until the respondent’s maximumWTP is reached. This bidding game
approach is applied to estimate WTP for health insurance. The “bidding game” has recently
been employed by several studies to estimate WTP for CBHI in low and middle income coun-
tries[19,22]. The bidding game may be accompanied by estimation bias, which is a form of
framing effect where respondents’ answers are influenced by the first numbers presented in the
bidding game[25]. However, some studies have used the bidding game without observing any
starting point bias[26,27].To determine appropriate starting bids, we interviewed numerous
workers from each occupational group and questioned them regarding appropriate prices for
CBHI. Based on the interview results we set a range from 10 to 30 BDT, and random figures in
this range were included in individual questionnaires as the starting bids.
The benefit package, which is the same as that offered by Gonoshasthaya Kendra against a
pre-paid membership card, was tested to investigate the WTP of workers for hypothetical
CBHI scheme. The product together with associated copayment is presented briefly in Table 1.
There were no deductibles in this hypothetical benefit package. Along with the services pre-
sented in Table 1, the financing mechanisms, and the terms and conditions under the hypo-
thetical CBHI were explained in details to the respondent before proceeding to ask the WTP.
The interviewer presented to the worker that four members of his household will be covered
through this package for one year period if the worker enrolled in this package. He further
explained outpatient health service will be provided through own doctor and medical paramed-
ics of the CBHI scheme and inpatient care will be provided through the contracted public and
private hospitals available locally. It was specified that there will be no super specialty hospitals
in the contracted hospital list. The insurance scheme will be managed through a government
registered cooperative where a management committee will be formed consisting the enrollees.
The ministry of Local Government and Rural Development will monitor the cooperative on
regular basis.
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The medical terminologies in the benefit package were explained to the respondent in local
language. The interviewers were trained to present the medical terminologies in locally under-
standable language. The Field Research Supervisor monitored the process of presenting benefit
package to the respondent. He helped data collector if there was any confusion on the medical
terminologies in the benefit package at field site.
After explaining the benefit package and health insurance mechanism, each respondent was
asked if he or she was willing-to-enroll in the CBHI scheme with his or her family members.
The bidding game was then employed to determine the maximum price (premium) that a
respondent will be willing-to-pay for the hypothetical CBHI scheme coverage for the four-
member of household. The interviewer asked the respondent if he/she was willing-to-pay the
randomly set amount as a starting bid. If the worker agreed, the interviewer would raise the bid
and again question their WTP. The interviewer would then continue until the worker
expressed unwillingness-to-pay. Conversely, if the worker expressed unwillingness-to-pay the
starting bid, the interviewer would lower the bid and repeat the query, continuing until they
reached a figure (including zero) that the worker was willing to pay.
Data analysis
Descriptive analysis. The total household income adjusted for household size using
OECD equivalence scale. This scale assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, of 0.7 to
each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child [28]. Then the adjusted size of household was
used to divide total household income to get the per-equivalent adult income. Similar approach
was adopted to estimate per equivalent adult expenditure. Monthly income was used to create
five income quintiles which were used to observe the association between income and WTP for
CBHI scheme.
Table 1. The service package of the health insurance product.
Health services Co-payment
Outpatient
Medical ofﬁcer visit Free of cost
Specialist visit 60 BDT
Inpatient
Bed-Payment per day 50 BDT
Diagnostic tests
Ultra-sonography 75–150 BDT
ECG 50 BDT
Most of the low cost tests (Like, Blood grouping, Hb%, Stool
test, Random Blood Sugar)
Free of cost
Some tests (like, Blood TC/DC/ESR, Urine RE,) 10–200 BDT
Blood transfusion of neonatal 500 BDT
Other treatment of neonatal Free of cost
Normal delivery 100–500 BDT
Caesarean and other surgery 2000–3000 BDT
Orthopedic surgery 3000–4000 BDT
Appendicitis 100 BDT
Gall bladder operation 3000 BDT
Medicine 50% discount on maximum retail price
set by government
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t001
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Mean and median WTP were estimated directly from the collected data. One way ANOVA
test was conducted to test the difference in meanWTP across different occupational groups
and areas. In total 13 outliers among WTP responses were identified using the approach pro-
posed by Hadi, 1994 for the detection of outliers [29]. The meanWTP after removing outliers
were presented separately. We used STATA version 11 for the statistical analyses. The minimal
dataset underlying the findings of this study has been provided as supporting information (see
S1 Dataset).
Econometric model. In the regression model, we predicted natural logged WTP based on
respondent demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Folland et al. (2007) produced a
theoretical model in which premium, income or wealth, health status and risk of income loss
can affect demand for health insurance[30]. Other researchers have identified similar factors in
the empirical investigations[31–34]. The model below is used in the analysis:
lnðYiÞ ¼ b0 þ b1X1i þ b2X2i þ . . .þ εi
i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n
where Yi denotes natural logged WTP for joining an insurance scheme, β0 is a constant,X1, X2,
X3,. . .. . ., Xn denote the control variables,β1, β2, β3,. . .. . .βn represents the coefﬁcient that
shows the magnitude and direction of the relationship of corresponding variables with Y, and
ε is an error term. Because we used the natural logarithm of WTP as the dependent variable,
the coefﬁcients represented either semi-elasticities (if the independent variable is in natural
units, e.g. age) or elasticities (if the independent variable is logarithmically transformed, e.g.
income) [35]. The model is tested for sensitivity by including and excluding speciﬁc variables
and by estimating the robust standard error. A series of diagnostic tests are performed, such as
tests on the presence of heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and omitted variables.
Further, we predicted regression model using the WTP as proportion of income with the
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent. Since the dependant vari-
able in this case is a proportion (WTP as share of income), the Generalized Linear Model
(GLM) with binomial family and logit link function was applied as proposed by Papke &
Wooldridge, 1996 [36].
Results
Characteristics of respondents
Out of the 557 respondents, 33.4% were rickshaw-pullers, 34.6% were shopkeepers and 32.0%
were restaurant workers. The three occupation groups differed significantly in marital status,
gender, age, education or household income.
However, the occupational groups did differ significantly in household size, educational
level and household expenditure (Table 2). The correlation between monthly income and
expenditure of the workers was 0.54 (p = 0.000).
Willingness to join in CBHI scheme and payment mode
86.7% of the respondents were willing to pay for CBHI. Respondents were offered two possible
modes, weekly and monthly, for the payment of premiums; 63.4% chose the former and 36.7%
chose the latter (Table 3).
Across the three locations, the metropolitan city location had the highest proportion of
respondents (78.7%) who chose weekly payments, while the district town location has the high-
est proportion (53.3%) who chose monthly payments. The majority of rickshaw-pullers
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(78.9%) chose the weekly payment mode, while most shopkeepers (51.6%) chose the monthly
payment mode.
WTP for health insurance
The average WTP elicited by the bidding game was 22.8 BDT per week, with a 95% confidence
interval (CI) of 20.9–24.8, which is approximately 20% higher than the median WTP (20.0
BDT). Average WTP was highest in the sub-district town location (27.0 BDT) followed by the
metropolitan city (24.5 BDT) and the district town (16.6 BDT) locations. While the outliers
were excluded, the average WTP was highest in Metropolitan city (22.5 BDT) followed by sub-
district town (21.2 BDT) and district town (16.6 BDT). Average WTP was highest among rick-
shaw-pullers (28.2 BDT), followed by restaurant workers (20.4 BDT) and shopkeepers (19.2
BDT).
Table 2. Respondent and household characteristics.
Variables Rickshaw-
puller
Shop-
keeper
Restaurant
worker
Difference across occupational group
(p-value)
Total
Age 32.9 27.3 31.1 0.028 30.4
Gender (Male %) 99.5 98.5 87.6 0.000 95.3
Marital status (Married %) 82.8 37.8 64.6 0.012 61.4
Household size 4.6 5.5 4.8 0.072 5.0
Educational level
Less than one year (%) 72 11 44 0.092 42
Up to primary (%) 23 33 36 0.073 30
More than primary (%) 5 56 20 0.051 28
Monthly income of the worker (BDT) 7,696.5 5,870.4 5,617.0 0.011 6,399.2
Household income per equivalent adult
(BDT)
3,256.6 5,015.9 3,037.9 0.004 3,839.1
Household expenditure per equivalent
adult (BDT)
2,948.7 3,473.6 2,328.3 0.998 2,965.2
Location
Metropolitan city (%) 33.3 32.1 33.7 33.0
District (%) 34.4 36.2 34.2 35.0
Sub-district (%) 32.2 31.6 32.0 31.9
Observations 186 193 178 557
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t002
Table 3. Distribution of participant WTP health insurance premiumsweekly versusmonthly by loca-
tion and occupational group.
Weekly payment Monthly payment
Locations
Sub-district 63.6% 36.4%
District 46.8% 53.3%
Metropolitan city 78.7% 21.3%
Occupational groups
Rickshaw-puller 78.9% 21.1%
Shop-keeper 48.4% 51.6%
Restaurant workers 60.7% 39.4%
Total 63.4% 36.7%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t003
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One-way ANOVA showed significant differences in WTP among locations and occupa-
tional groups (Table 4).
WTP and income
Fig 1 showed that the average WTP was higher among worker in richer income quintiles. How-
ever, the WTP as share of income was decreasing from lower income to higher income
quintiles.
Determinants of WTP
Regression analysis (Table 5) showed that educational level, monthly income, location and
occupation significantly influenced WTP for CBHI among informal workers. Workers with up
to a primary level of education were willing to pay 26.9% less than those with less than one year
of education. Moreover, WTP increased a significant 0.196% with each 1% increase in monthly
income of the worker. In the sub-district town and district town locations WTP was signifi-
cantly lower (1.4% and 48.7% less, respectively) compared with the metropolitan city. WTP
differed significantly among occupational groups. Shopkeepers and restaurant workers were
willing to pay significantly less than rickshaw-pullers (68.5% and 38.6% less, respectively).
The regression model explains 21.9% of total variations (R2 = 0.219). The Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg test showed that heteroscedasticity was absent from the model. The variance
inflation factor (VIF) test obtained a maximum value of 2.24, which indicated no multicolli-
nearity in the regression model. Ramsey RESET test showed sufficient evidence that the model
did not suffer from omitted variable bias.
Robust standard error was calculated to test the robustness of the relationship between the
magnitude of WTP (natural logged) and its determinants (Table 5). The regression model was
reduced and extended by excluding and including variables. Determinants of WTP for the
CBHI were similar for all models.
The GLM showed worker’s education level, monthly income, location and occupation were
significantly associated with the WTP as share of income (Table 6). Households with higher
income were more likely to have lower WTP as percentage of their income. Worker with pri-
mary education was less likely to have lower WTP as percentage than workers who have less
than one year education.
WTP as percentage of income were lower among workers in district area than metropolitan
city and among shop worker than Rickshaw-puller.
Table 4. WTP (mean and CI) per week across occupational groups and locations.
Average WTP(BDT)
(95% CI)
Average WTP excluding outliers (BDT)
(95% CI)
Median WTP
(BDT)
Signiﬁcance test
(p-value)
Locations
Sub-district 27.0(22.5–31.6) 21.2 (18.9–23.4) 20.0 0.00
District 16.6(14.5–18.6) 16.6 (14.5–18.6) 12.5
Metropolitan city 24.5(21.7–27.4) 22.5 (20.5–24.5) 20.0
Occupational
groups
Rickshaw-puller 28.2(24.7–31.7) 25.0 (22.9–27.0) 20.0 0.00
Shop-keeper 19.2(16.1–22.4) 16.5 (14.4–18.6) 12.5
Restaurant workers 20.4(17.0–23.8) 18.2 (16.2–20.2) 15.0
Total 22.8(20.9–24.8) 20.1 (18.9–21.3) 20.0 0.00
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t004
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Discussion
We found that a large proportion of informal workers (86.7%) were willing to pay for CBHI.
They were willing to pay an average amount of 22.8 BDT (0.286 USD) weekly per household.
This estimate varied across geographic locations and occupation of the respondents. Rickshaw-
pullers were willing to pay the highest amount (28.2 BDT), followed by restaurant-workers
(20.4 BDT) and shop-keepers (19.2 BDT). The largest WTP of rickshaw-pullers can be
explained by their nature of income, e.g. they receive cash earnings every working day and
need not to wait for weekly or monthly salary and their access to liquidity is higher and more
frequent than other two occupation groups. WTP for health insurance varied across occupa-
tional groups, as did their preferred payment mode. The majority of rickshaw-pullers (78.9%)
and Restaurant workers (60.7%) preferred weekly payment and shopkeepers (51.6%) chose the
monthly payment.
A good number of literatures were published, which presented WTP for health insurance in
low- and middle-income countries both in Asia and Africa. A study in Ghana found that
almost 64% of respondents were willing to pay about Cedi 5000 (3 USD) per month per five-
member household for a National Health Insurance scheme aimed at the informal sector [21].
Asgary et al. (2004) examined WTP for health insurance in rural Iran and found that house-
holds were willing to pay an average of 2.77 USD per month for health insurance [37]. In
another recent study in Iran the average WTP for social health insurance per person per
month was found 5.5 USD [38]. A study in Namibia found that uninsured individual in the
Greater Windhoek Area of Namibia was willing to pay 47.50 NAD (6.60 USD) per month for
individual health insurance [19]. Donfouet et al. 2011 found substantial demand for CBHI
Fig 1. AverageWTP andWTP as percentage of income (weekly) across income quintiles of the workers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.g001
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among rural households of Cameroon with willing to pay 1011 CFA francs (2.15 USD) per per-
son per month [39]. An Indian study showed that median WTP was 55 INR (1.09 USD) per
month [22]. Another study reported that people in rural India were willing to pay 1500 INR
(27 USD) annually for CBHI [40]. Malaysia, a middle income country, using CVM approach
revealed that more than 63.1% of the respondents were willing to join CBHI with an average
payment of 114.38 USD per month per household [41]. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, an
upper-middle-income Caribbean country, 72.3% respondents were willing to join with WTP
77.83 EC$ (28.83 USD) per month per person to enroll in the National Health Insurance plan
[42].
The multivariate analyses that we employed for predicting WTP for health insurance of
informal workers suggested that the WTP was influenced significantly by educational level,
monthly income, location and occupation of workers. Our finding of strong positive relation-
ship between monthly income andWTP, was supported by other researchers [21,22,41,43,44].
Such findings can be justified by higher ability-to-pay of households with higher income level
and WTP appeared to be higher with higher ability-to-pay [43].
While expected a positive relationship between educational level and WTP, we found, on
the contrary, a significant negative influence of education. However, a previous study in urban
China observed a similar outcome as ours [44]. In the context of Bangladesh, the knowledge
about health insurance is not commonly available, especially among low-income people, given
that only 0.1% of total health expenditure here was funded by private health insurance [5]. It
was further observed that the geographic location of workers contributed to variations in WTP
Table 5. Association of respondent characteristics with WTP (natural logged) for health insurance coverage from amultivariate regression
analysis.
Variables Description Coefﬁcient (Std. Err.)
Age In years -0.002(0.005)
Gender Female (Ref = male) -0.15(0.193)
Marital status Unmarried (ref = married) 0.025(0.11)
Others (ref = married) 0.29(0.749)
Household size Number of household members 0.025(0.033)
Educational level Up to primary level (ref = less than one year) -0.269** (0.112)
More than primary level (ref = less than one year) -0.056(0.125)
Monthly income Logged income per month 0.196** (0.077)
Illness in last 6 months Illness of respondent or any household member -0.01(0.125)
Location Sub-district (ref = Metropolitan city) -0.014*** (0.102)
District (ref = Metropolitan city) -0.487*** (0.105)
Occupation Shop worker (ref = Rickshaw-puller) -0.685*** (0.127)
Restaurant workers (ref = Rickshaw-puller) -0.386** (0.115)
Constant 1.83(0.672)
N 326
Adjusted R-square 0.219
F-value(14,146) (Prob>F) 8.01 (0.000)
Mean VIF (max) 1.51 (2.24)
BP/Cook-Weisberg test (p>ch2) 0.45 (0.503)
Ramsey RESET, F (p>F) 3.46 (0.017)
Note
*** denotes signiﬁcant at 1% risk level.
** denotes signiﬁcant at 5% risk level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t005
Willingness-to-Pay for Community-Based Health Insurance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211 February 1, 2016 10 / 16
significantly. Asgary et al. 2004, Dror et al. 2007, Onwujekwe et al. 2010 and Binnendijk et al.
2013 also observed significant association between WTP and geographical locations
[22,37,45,46]. Similar to this current study, several earlier studies observed significant associa-
tion with occupation groups andWTP [19,42,47]. Respondent’s age showed no significant, but
negative relationship with WTP. Several earlier studies found negative relationship between
age and WTP [22,39,48]. The age variable may capture cohort effects. Age is plausibly not only
proxies for disease risk but also associated with factors that are not controlled for in our regres-
sion analyses. For instance, older informal workers may believe that their children will finance
their healthcare when they become ill, while younger workers do not [20]. A further model was
tested using quadratic function of age (age×age) as an explanatory variable. It showed no sig-
nificant relation with WTP. However the coefficient of age variable showed only 0.2% changes
in WTP due to one unit changes in age.
The GLM showed WTP as percentage of income were more likely to decrease with
increased income. This association follows the Engel’s laws which states that the proportion of
income spent on food decreases as income increases, though the actual expenditure on food
rises [49,50]. This finding indicated that health insurance is considered as a necessity good
among informal worker. This was in line with the findings of Binnendijk et al. (2013), which
showed that the rural poor in India considered health insurance as a necessity good with no
prior experience of any insurance packages [46].
While most of our study findings were supported by other studies, there were some limita-
tions. One potential limitation of CVMmight be related to the respondent bias that might
result from the starting bid [25,51]. To reduce the effect of such bias, we used various starting
bid values ranging between 10 BDT and 30 BDT. Another important limitation of our study
was that the interviews took place from December to April, and thus could not capture seasonal
fluctuations in income of informal workers. However, usage of multivariate analysis in this
Table 6. Association of respondent characteristics with proportion of WTP and income for health insurance coverage from a GLM regression
analysis
Variables Description Odds ratio (95% CI)
Age In years 0.99 (0.98–1.01)
Gender Female (Ref = male) 0.83 (0.5–1.37)
Marital status Unmarried (ref = married) 1.08 (0.83–1.39)
Others (ref = married) 1.25 (0.65–2.42)
Household size Number of household members 0.99 (0.96–1.04)
Educational level Up to primary level (ref = less than one year) 0.66*** (0.52–0.85)
More than primary level (ref = less than one year) 0.98 (0.71–1.37)
Monthly income Logged income per month 0.46*** (0.34–0.61)
Illness in last 6 months Illness of respondent or any household member 1.07 (0.71–1.61)
Location Sub-district (ref = Metropolitan city) 1.25 (0.94–1.65)
District (ref = Metropolitan city) 0.59*** (0.48–0.73)
Occupation Shop worker (ref = Rickshaw-puller) 0.64** (0.45–0.9)
Restaurant workers (ref = Rickshaw-puller) 0.75 (0.49–1.17)
Constant 25.25*** (2.28–279.84)
N 326
Note
*** denotes signiﬁcant at 1% risk level.
** denotes signiﬁcant at 5% risk level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211.t006
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paper considered workers with different income levels and might have captured proxy of sea-
sonal variations in income to a good extent. The fundamental problem in estimating WTP in
developing country context is that not many low-income people may understand the mecha-
nism of health insurance scheme and the benefit package [31,52,53]. The poor understanding
about health insurance mechanism can influence the demand or WTP for such product [54].
It was not very clear what portion of workers understood the insurance mechanism and
benefit package to a good extent for making a rational choice on the amount they were willing
to pay. It, however, can be argued that for minimizing the perception effect on decision making
for WTP, we employed benefit packages that were available and familiar to workers in some
areas (Public Health Centre in Dhaka and Savar) in Bangladesh. However, for establishing
CBHI schemes there are other methods for developing benefit package of health insurance in
developing countries through engaging low-income people [55,56].
Demand of health insurance, measured by WTP might not be influenced by the variables
only that were applied in this study and in similar ones. Enrollment in health insurance had
been affected by other variables according to some other studies. For instance, Roth et al.
(2007) found that lack of knowledge about the importance of health insurance was an impor-
tant determinant of health insurance product uptake [57]. From a client perspective, simplicity;
affordability and value of micro health insurance products were found to influence the adop-
tion of such product [31]. Even enrolment options and procedures [58] and proximity to qual-
ity healthcare facilities [59] had influence in joining health insurance. Therefore, the Cohen
and Sebstad (2006) emphasized on the importance of creating awareness among the people on
health insurance for creating demand [32]. It was even observed that people often do not trust
the health insurance providers, which might have an impact on enrollment (Churchill, 2006).
There were non-price frictions that could further limit demand; like limited trust and under-
standing of the product, product salience, and liquidity constraints. Rademarcher et al. (2010)
argued that the trust to be developed in two dimensions; first the insurer is willing to make pay-
ments to clients, and second, the insurer is able to deliver the payments or services [60]. The
improvements in insurance contract design and keeping the promise to beneficiaries can sig-
nificantly mitigate these frictions [61]. It was, however, found in a study in India that a cam-
paign using information and education had influence in health insurance enrollment [62].
CBHIs were criticized for poor designs with weak legislative, technical and regulatory
frameworks which affect enrolment in CBHI and consequently the level of financial protection
offered [63]. A systematic review of studies on impact of CBHI in low-income countries found
strong evidence that it provides some financial protection and weak evidence that it affect qual-
ity of care [64]. These effects of CBHI are small in terms of population coverage [64]. However,
CBHIs operating in countries (like, Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania) with adequate legislative
measures and government partnership was more successful in terms of coverage and risk pro-
tection [65,66]. Broader risk pools and proper design and implementation are important for
mitigating the existing limitations of the CBHI schemes [67,68]. CBHI mechanism can play
useful role where compulsory sources provide (like, enrollees) only minimal level of prepay-
ment and redirect it to other prepayment pools (for instance, assistance from Government or
international community) and CBHI can expand financial risk protection or healthcare seeking
and help people to understand the benefits of being insured [11].
This current study provided the evidence onWTP for CBHI among urban informal sector
workers and identified the major drivers of WTP. This finding will be useful in estimating the
potential number of CBHI enrollees and potential revenue generation in low and middle
income countries among the informal workers. Information on the prevailing preferences of
the population for CBHI are limited in low- and middle-income countries. Policy makers,
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health care providers, and CBHI initiators thus can be benefited enormously from the esti-
mates of WTP obtained in this study.
Universal Health Coverage, which is a global policy agenda as well as agenda for national
governments in many low- and middle-income countries including Bangladesh, can find this
study contributory when financial risk protection through risk pooling is considered [10,11].
The government of Bangladesh considered introducing CBHI scheme for informal workers in
the healthcare financing strategy of the country [10]. Findings from this study could be useful
for planning such schemes. In addition, other community-based models, like a public-commu-
nity partnership model of healthcare financing in India (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana,
RSBY) could be tried considering its experience, where government can be the guarantor and
subsidize the premium [69].
Supporting Information
S1 Dataset.
(DTA)
Acknowledgments
This research study was funded by International Labor Organization (ILO) and Microinsur-
ance Innovation Facility (MIF). icddr,b acknowledges with gratitude the commitment of ILO
and MIF to its research efforts. icddr,b is also thankful to the Governments of Australia, Ban-
gladesh, Canada, Sweden and the UK for providing core/unrestricted support. We like to
thank Md. Khurshid Alam of icddr,b and Dr. Shawkat Hossain Arman of Gonoswasthyo-Ken-
dro for their support. We are very grateful to Dr. Jocalyn Clark and Md. Toufiq Rahman of
icddr,b and Andrew Mirelman of JHU for their valuable comments.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SA MEH JAMK. Performed the experiments: SA
JAMKMEH. Analyzed the data: SA MEH ARS MS ZI RG JAMK. Contributed reagents/mate-
rials/analysis tools: SA MEH ARS MS ZI RG JAMK. Wrote the paper: SA MEH ARS MS ZI RG
JAMK.
References
1. Wagstaff A, van Doorslaer E. Catastrophe and impoverishment in paying for health care: with applica-
tions to Vietnam 1993–1998. Health Econ. 2003; 12: 921–34. doi: 10.1002/hec.776 PMID: 14601155
2. Xu K, Evans DB, Kawabata K, Zeramdini R, Klavus J, Murray CJL. Household catastrophic health
expenditure: a multicountry analysis. Lancet. 2003; 362: 111–7. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(03)13861-5
PMID: 12867110
3. O’Donnell O, van Doorslaer E, Rannan-Eliya R, Somanathan A, Garg C, Hanvoravongchai P, et al.
Explaining the incidence of catastrophic expenditures on health care: Comparative evidence from Asia.
Mimeo; 2005. Report No.: Working paper no 5.
4. Amaya Lara JL, Ruiz Gómez F. Determining factors of catastrophic health spending in Bogota, Colom-
bia. Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2011; 11: 83–100. doi: 10.1007/s10754-011-9089-3 PMID:
21359837
5. MoHFW. Bangladesh National Health Accounts 1997–2012. Dhaka; 2015. Available: http://www.who.
int/nha/country/bgd/en/
6. JPGSPH. Bangladesh Health watch 2014. Dhaka; 2015.
7. Van Doorslaer E, O’Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, Somanathan A, Adhikari SR, Garg CC, et al. Effect of
payments for health care on poverty estimates in 11 countries in Asia: an analysis of household survey
data. Lancet. 2006; 368: 1357–1364. PMID: 17046468
Willingness-to-Pay for Community-Based Health Insurance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211 February 1, 2016 13 / 16
8. Van Doorslaer E, O’Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, Somanathan A, Adhikari SR, Garg CC, et al. Cata-
strophic payments for health care in Asia. Heal Econ. 2007; 16: 1159–1184.
9. Balabanova D, Mills A, Conteh L, Akkazieva B, Banteyerga H, Dash U, et al. Good Health at Low Cost
25 years on: lessons for the future of health systems strengthening. Lancet. 2013; 381: 2118–33. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62000-5 PMID: 23574803
10. MoHFW. Expanding Social Protection for Health: Towards Universal Coverage, Health Care Financing
Strategy 2012–2032. Dhaka; 2012.
11. WHO. The world health report: health systems financing: the path to universal coverage. Geneva:
Geneva: World Health Organisation; 2010.
12. Muhit AMA. Four Years of Progress: Bangladesh Marches on—Budget Speech 2013–14. Dhaka: Min-
istry of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; 2013. Available: http://www.mof.
gov.bd/en/budget/13_14/budget_speech/speech_en.pdf
13. Hussmanns R. Developments in the design and implementation of informal sector and similar surveys
—A review of national practices and experiences. Geneva; 1998.
14. Maligalig DS, Cuevas S, Rosario A. Informal Employment in Bangladesh. SSRN Electronic Journal.
Manila; 2009 Apr. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1611402
15. Rahman MM, Gilmour S, Saito E, Sultana P, Shibuya K. Self-reported illness and household strategies
for coping with health-care payments in Bangladesh. Bull World Health Organ. 2013; 91: 449–58. doi:
10.2471/BLT.12.115428 PMID: 24052682
16. Musango L, Doetinchem O, Carrin G. De la mutualisation du risque maladie à l ‘ assurance maladie uni-
verselle Expérience du Rwanda DISCUSSION PAPER De la mutualisation du risque maladie à l ‘
assurance maladie universelle Expérience du Rwanda. Geneva; 2009.
17. Akazili J. Equity in health care financing in Ghana. University of Cape Town. 2010.
18. Dror DM. Social reinsurance: a new approach to sustainable community health financing. Preker A, edi-
tor. Washington DC: World Bank Publications; 2002. Available: http://books.google.com/books?hl=
en&lr=&id=nX5WLYimInAC&pgis=1
19. Gustafsson-Wright E, Asfaw A, van der Gaag J. Willingness to pay for health insurance: an analysis of
the potential market for new low-cost health insurance products in Namibia. Soc Sci Med. 2009; 69:
1351–9. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.08.011 PMID: 19765877
20. Bärnighausen T, Liu Y, Zhang X, Sauerborn R. Willingness to pay for social health insurance among
informal sector workers in Wuhan, China: a contingent valuation study. BMC Health Serv Res. 2007; 7:
114. doi: 10.1186/1472-6963-7-114 PMID: 17659084
21. Asenso-Okyere WK, Osei-Akoto I, Anum A, Appiah EN. Willingness to pay for health insurance in a
developing economy. A pilot study of the informal sector of Ghana using contingent valuation. Health
Policy (New York). 1997; 42: 223–237. doi: 10.1016/S0168-8510(97)00069-9
22. Dror DM, Radermacher R, Koren R. Willingness to pay for health insurance among rural and poor per-
sons: field evidence from seven micro health insurance units in India. Health Policy. 2007; 82: 12–27.
doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.07.011 PMID: 16971017
23. Mathiyazhagan K. Willingness to pay for rural health insurance through community participation in
India. Int J Health Plann Manage. 1998; 13: 47–67. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1751(199801/03)
13:1<47::AID-HPM495>3.0.CO;2-I PMID: 10178583
24. Kobelt G. Health Economics: An introduction to economic evaluation. 2nd editio. London: Office of
Health Economics; 2002.
25. Drummond M, O’Brien B, Stoddart G, Torrance G. Methods for the economic evaluation of health care.
3rd editio. Oxford: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS; 2008.
26. O’Brien BJ, Goeree R, Gafni A, Torrance GW, Pauly M V, Erder H, et al. Assessing the value of a new
pharmaceutical. A feasibility study of contingent valuation in managed care. Med Care. 1998; 36: 370–
84. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9520961 PMID: 9520961
27. O’Brien B, Viramontes JL. Willingness to pay: a valid and reliable measure of health state preference?
Med Decis Mak. 1994; 14: 289–97. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7934716
28. OECD. The OECD List of Social Indicators. Paris; 1982.
29. Hadi AS. A Modification of a Method for the Detection of Outliers in Multivariate Samples. J R Stat Soc.
1994; 56: 393–396.
30. Folland S, Goodman AC, Stano M. The Economics of health and health care. New Jersey: Pearson
Prentice Hall; 2007.
31. Churchill C. What is insurance for the poor? In Protecting the poor, A microinsurance compendium.
Geneva; 2006.
Willingness-to-Pay for Community-Based Health Insurance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211 February 1, 2016 14 / 16
32. Cohen M, J Sebstad. The demand for microinsurance. In Protecting the poor, A microinsurance com-
pendium. Geneva; 2006.
33. McCord M. Visions of the future of Microinsurance, and thoughts on getting there. Washington; 2008.
34. Leftley R, Mapfumo S. Effective microinsurance programs to reduce vulnerability. Oxford; 2006.
35. Gujarati D, Porter D. Basic Econometrics. McGraw-Hill/Irwin; 2008.
36. Papke LE, Wooldridge JM. Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application
to 401(k) plan participation rates. J Appl Econom. 1996; 11: 619–632. doi: 10.2307/2285155
37. Asgary A, Willis K, Taghvaei AA, Rafeian M. Estimating rural households’ willingness to pay for health
insurance. Eur J Health Econ. 2004; 5: 209–15. doi: 10.1007/s10198-004-0233-6 PMID: 15714341
38. Nosratnejad S, Rashidian A, Mehrara M, Akbari Sari A, Mahdavi G, Moeini M. Willingness to pay for the
social health insurance in Iran. Glob J Health Sci. 2014; 6: p154. doi: 10.5539/gjhs.v6n5p154
39. Donfouet HPP, Makaudze E, Mahieu P- A, Malin E. The determinants of the willingness-to-pay for com-
munity-based prepayment scheme in rural Cameroon. Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2011; 11: 209–
20. doi: 10.1007/s10754-011-9097-3 PMID: 21874541
40. Jain A, Swetha S, Johar Z, Raghavan R. Acceptability of, and willingness to pay for, community health
insurance in rural India. J Epidemiol Glob Health. 2014; doi: 10.1016/j.jegh.2013.12.004
41. Shafie AA, Hassali MA. Willingness to pay for voluntary community-based health insurance: findings
from an exploratory study in the state of Penang, Malaysia. Soc Sci Med. 2013; 96: 272–6. doi: 10.
1016/j.socscimed.2013.02.045 PMID: 23528670
42. Adams R, Chou Y-J, Pu C. Willingness to participate and Pay for a proposed national health insurance
in St. Vincent and the grenadines: a cross-sectional contingent valuation approach. BMC Health Serv
Res. 2015; 15: 148. doi: 10.1186/s12913-015-0806-3 PMID: 25890181
43. Dong H, Kouyate B, Cairns J, Mugisha F, Sauerborn R. Willingness-to-pay for community-based insur-
ance in Burkina Faso. Health Econ. 2003; 12: 849–62. doi: 10.1002/hec.771 PMID: 14508869
44. Ying X-H, Hu T-W, Ren J, ChenW, Xu K, Huang J-H. Demand for private health insurance in Chinese
urban areas. Health Econ. 2007; 16: 1041–50. doi: 10.1002/hec.1206 PMID: 17199233
45. Onwujekwe O, Okereke E, Onoka C, Uzochukwu B, Kirigia J, Petu A. Willingness to pay for commu-
nity-based health insurance in Nigeria: Do economic status and place of residence matter? Health Pol-
icy Plan. 2010; 25: 155–161. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czp046 PMID: 20156920
46. Binnendijk E, Dror DM, Gerelle E, Koren R. EstimatingWillingness-to-Pay for health insurance among
rural poor in India by reference to Engel’s law. Soc Sci Med. 2013; 76: 67–73. doi: 10.1016/j.
socscimed.2012.10.006 PMID: 23157931
47. Haile M, Ololo S, Megersa B. Willingness to join community-based health insurance among rural
households of Debub Bench District, Bench Maji Zone, Southwest Ethiopia. BMC Public Health. 2014;
14: 591. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-14-591 PMID: 24920538
48. Khan JAM, Ahmed S. Impact of educational intervention on willingness-to-pay for health insurance: A
study of informal sector workers in urban Bangladesh. Health Econ Rev. 2013; 3: 12. doi: 10.1186/
2191-1991-3-12 PMID: 23628206
49. Engel E. Die Lebenskosten Belgischer Arbeiter Familien fruher und jetzt. Bull l ‘Institut Int Stat. 1895; 9:
1–129.
50. Perthel D. Engel’s Law Revisited. Int Stat Rev. 1975; 43: 211–218.
51. Kartman B, Andersson F, Johannesson M. Willingness to pay for reductions in angina pectoris attacks.
Med Decis Making. 1996; 16: 248–53. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8818123 PMID:
8818123
52. Panda P, Chakraborty A, Dror DM. Building awareness to health insurance among the target population
of community-based health insurance schemes in rural India. Trop Med Int Health. 2015; 20: 1093–
107. doi: 10.1111/tmi.12524 PMID: 25876515
53. Bawa SK. Awareness andWillingness to Pay for Health Insurance: An Empirical Study with Reference
to Punjab India. Int J Humanit Soc Sci. 2011; 1: 100–108.
54. Cole S, Giné X, Tobacman J, Townsend R, Topalova P, Vickery J. Barriers to Household Risk Manage-
ment: Evidence from India. Am Econ J Appl Econ. 2013; 5: 104–135. doi: 10.1257/app.5.1.104 PMID:
24765234
55. Dror DM, Koren R, Ost A, Binnendijk E, Vellakkal S, Danis M. Health insurance benefit packages priori-
tized by low-income clients in India: three criteria to estimate effectiveness of choice. Soc Sci Med.
2007; 64: 884–96. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.10.032 PMID: 17141931
56. Danis M, Binnendijk E, Vellakkal S, Ost A, Koren R, Dror DM. Eliciting Choices Health of Low Insurance
Benefit Income Groups. Econ Polit Wkly. 2007; 42: 3331–3335+3337–3339.
Willingness-to-Pay for Community-Based Health Insurance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211 February 1, 2016 15 / 16
57. Roth J, McCord MJ, Liber D. The Landscape of Microinsurance in theWorld’s 100 Poorest Countries.
The Microinsurance Centre, LLC. Appleton; 2007. Available: http://www.microinsurancecentre.org
58. Mathauer I, Schmidt JO, Wenyaa M. Extending social health insurance to the informal sector in Kenya.
An assessment of factors affecting demand. Int J Heal Plann Manag. 2008; 23: 51–68. doi: 10.1002/
hpm.914
59. Nguyen H, Knowles J. Demand for voluntary health insurance in developing countries: the case of Viet-
nam’s school-age children and adolescent student health insurance program. Soc Sci Med. 2010; 71:
2074–82. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.09.033 PMID: 20974514
60. Radermacher R, Ashok S, Zabel K, Dror I. What do we know about the impact of microinsurance?
Micro Insurance Academy. New Delhi; 2009.
61. Dupas P, Foster A, Glennerster R. Bundling Health Insurance and Micro nance in India: There Cannot
be Adverse Selection if There Is No Demand †. Am Econ Rev. 2014; 104: 291–297. PMID: 25214652
62. Das J, Leino J. Evaluating the RSBY: Lessons from an Experimental Information Campaign. Econ Polit
Wkly. 2011; xlvi.
63. Basaza R, Criel B, Van der Stuyft P. Community health insurance in Uganda: Why does enrolment
remain low? A view from beneath. Health Policy (New York). 2008; 87: 172–184.
64. Ekman B. Community-based health insurance in low-income countries: a systematic review of the evi-
dence. Health Policy Plan. 2004; 19: 249–70. PMID: 15310661
65. Logie DE, RowsonM, Ndagije F. Innovations in Rwanda’s health system: looking to the future. Lancet
(London, England). 2008; 372: 256–61. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(08)60962-9
66. Twahirwa A. Sharing the Burden of Sickness: Mutual Health Insurance in Rwanda. Bull World Health
Organ. World Health Organization; 2008; 86: 823. Available: https://www.questia.com/library/journal/
1G1-190379297/sharing-the-burden-of-sickness-mutual-health-insurance PMID: 19030682
67. Jütting J. Do community-based health insurance schemes improve poor people’s access to health
care? Evidence from rural Senegal. World Dev. 2004;
68. Acharya A, Vellakkal S, Fiona T, Edoardo M, Satija A, Burke M, et al. The impact of health insurance
schemes for the informal sector in low- and middle-income countries : a systematic review. Policy Res
Work Pap Ser. TheWorld Bank; 2013; Available: http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/6324.html
69. Dror DM, Vellakkal S. Is RSBY India’s platform to implementing universal hospital insurance? Indian J
Med Res. 2012; 135: 56–63. Available: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=
3307185&tool=pmcentrez&rendertype=abstract PMID: 22382184
Willingness-to-Pay for Community-Based Health Insurance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148211 February 1, 2016 16 / 16
